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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
JOE TOTORICA,
Plaintiff and Respondent.
vs.

Gase. No.
10,152

nay E .. Thomas, et al,

RELIANCE NATIONAL LIFE. INf'URANCE COMPANY, a corpora-

tion,
Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANT'S

BRIE~F

·j
l

NATURE, OF THE CAS.E
This is an appeal from the judgment of the District
Court wherein it was determined that the plaintiff's
(Totorica) lien for labor and materials is prior in time
and right to defendant and appellant's (Reliance)
mortgage upon the premises.
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DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT
The matter came on for trial before the District
Court for foreclosure of plaintiff's lien for labor and
materials and Reliance contended that its mortgage,·
which was recorded two weeks before plaintiff's delayed
lien notice, was prior in time and right to the lien of
the plaintiff; that plaintiff had completed his contract
and suspended his work for more than thirty days and
had not brought his action to enforce the lien within
twelve months after such suspension of work.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
By this appeal, 'defendant seeks to have its mortgage
declared first in time and right ahead of the late-filed
mechanic's lien of plaintiff. Also, to determine whether
this action was filed within the twelve-month period
required by Section 38-1-11, UCA 1953.
STATE1\fENT OF FACTS
Appellant's mortgage was dated March 15, 19'62,
and. executed by Daniel G. Thomas and Bette E. Thomas,
the then record title owners of the property, to secure
a promissory note in favor of appellant and such was
duly recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County
Recorder on March 23, 1962. ·The plaintiff's Notice of ·
Lien was not recorded until April 10, 1962, in the Office
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of the Salt Lake County Recorder. At that time, and
now, DaniPl G. Thomas and his wife were, and still are,
the owners of record of such real estate. At the time
of pre-trial the plaintiff dismissed his lien foreclosure
adion against said owners of the property, Daniel G.
Thoma~,

et ux. (R. 26)

The Notice of Lien recites a written contract betwPPn plaintiff and Ray E. Thomas ·(a brother to Daniel
G. Thomas, but not an owner of record) and asserts that
the first work was done on June 1, 1961, but that the
last work was not done until March 31, 1962. A $3,000
unpaid balance is asserted by the plaintiff on a $12,000
contract. The undisputed facts are that Daniel G.
Thomas and his wife and family moved into the property
on or about September 1, 1961, and have continuously
occupied the premises since then.
~The

record further shows that except for trifling,
insignificant items of work done since September, 1961,
the construction of the residence and completion of the
contract was finished in September, 1961. Plaintiff testified that he had certain minor items of work done and
materials furnished subsequent to that date, but no work
was done on the contract itself between the end of
October and the end of December, 1961, a period of more
than 30 days.
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Though the work was suspended for more than said
30-day period during the last two months of 1961, this
action was not filed until March 28, 1963, a period of
more than twelve months after suspension of work thereunder for a period of thirty days referred to in Section
38-1-11, UCA 19·53. Reference to the details in the
record showing such suspension of work will be made
in the Argument hereafter.
The time schedule, so far as is here pertinent in
the issues, reads as follows:
May 28, 1961

Contract for construction of home
between Ray E. Thomas and plaintiff; (Exh. P-3)

September, 1961

Daniel Thomas moved into completed house.

Last part of October or first part
of November:

Poured concrete in corner of window. (R-76-77)

November

"We hanged the storm doors in
November." (R-75) (The record
appears to be clear that such were
not included in the specifications
and they were procured and ordered by the tenant Dan Thomas
and paid for by him.) (R-76)

January 10, 1962

Front door threshold. (R-75 and
77) (Only a short piece of wood
under door)
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January 19, 1962

Insulation into attic completed.
(R-58) No cost stated.

FdH·uary 12, 1962

Rain guttering (R-58) No in contract.

FPbruary 1~, 1962

Aluminum mullion.
plus one hour.

Mareh 15, 1962

Note and mortgage executed by
Thomas to Reliance (Exh. P-1 and
P-2')

March 23, 1962

Mortgage
Page 35,3.

March 30, 1962

Plastering of foundation (R-63-65)
($25.00)

April, 1962

Painting. R-6:6067 ($35.00)

~\pril10,

Notice of Lien recorded (Exh. P-4)

1962

March 28, 1963

(R-60) $2.83

recorded, Book 1903,

Action filed to foreclose lien.

The rain guttering was not a part of the original
contract and it, and the other items done several months
after completion of the contract, were at the insistence
and request of Daniel G. Thomas, not the one with
whom the contract was made.
The court, in pursuance of pre-trial order entered
in this case and case No. 145329, entitled Reliance National Life Insurance Company vs. Daniel 'G. Thomas,
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et al, directed that both matters be heard consecutively
by the trial court as the second noted case was the
morgage foreclosure proceeding brought by appellant.
The determination of the priority of the mortgage of
the plaintiff's mechanic's lien in the present proceeding
(case No. 142254) should control in both cases. In the
second case all defendants defaulted and evidence was
duly adduced at the pre-trial and, hence, carried forward
to the trial date, showing the execution and delivery of
the mortgage referred to above and the fact of default
therein by the defendants; and the District Court thereupon directed foreclosure on the said mortgage action
against the premises. Such order was made subject to
the priority of the plaintiff's mechanic's lien as determined in this Case No. 142254 now under appeal.
·The plaintiff failed to present any evidence that
the Reliance mortgage was not taken and recorded in
complete good faith, without notice of plaintiff's claims.
Said mortgage was recorded March ·2.3, 19·62, prior to
any Notice given by plaintiff April 10, 1962. The home
had been occupied since September, 19·61, and none of
the insignificant items done by plaintiff in 1962 would
alert or give notice to a mortgage of an uncompleted
construction contract upon which lien rights might still
exist.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
RELIANCE IS A BONA FIDE MORTGAGEE WITHOUT
NOTICE 0 F PLAINTIFF'S LATER FILED LIEN.

The recording statutes of Utah have been established to protect purchasers and mortgagees against
prior liens and encumbrances on realty. Reliance has
dealt with this property in absolute good faith. The note
and mortgage were executed by the record title owner
who was in possession. No visible construction was in
progress when the mortgage was taken in March 1962.
The owner had occupied the completed dwelling since
September 19'61 - six months prior to the inspection
and mortgage date.
Section 57-3-2 U.C.A. 1953 provides that the recording of the mortgage "imparts notice to all persons of the
contents thereof; and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and lien holders shall be deemed to purchase and
take with notice." This statutory rule, plus the presumption of authenticity which attends the mortgage,
affirms the priority and good faith position of Reliance.
Keither at the pre-trial nor at the trial was any
attack made by plaintiff upon this mortgage. If the
Court is to consider the equities between the parties,
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Reliance as the innocent mortgagee must have first claim
upon the property.
Plaintiff, from the time the premises were completed and occupied in September 1961, had 80 days
within which to file his Notice of Lien. Had such been
done, no mortgage would have been taken and no loss
suffered by Reliance. Plaintiff has slept on his rights
as to the liening of the premises and permitted Reliance
to suffer this unfortunate circumstances now imposed by
the District Court.
~That

plaintiff knew of his earlier right to lien the
property back in December 1961 is evidenced by the
registered mail letter delivered to Mr. Ray 'Thomas (not
in possession or the owner of record) as shown by
Exh. D'-10. This calls attention to the unpaid balance
owing for construction of 1916 South 16th East and says,
"If satisfactory arrangements are not made by December 26, 1961, lien will be filed to protect our interests."
The fact of completion of the contract must be inferred
from this as no right of lien exists in an original contractor such as plaintiff unless and until there has been
"completion of the contract," 38-1-7 U.C.A. 1953.
No lien notice was ever filed until more than three
and one-half months after that letter and more than two
weeks after the Reliance mortgage had been recorded.
A bona fide mortgagee is entitled to protection in its
priority rights under these circumstances.
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"2. He is lawfully seized of said premises in
fee simple and has good and lawful right to mortgage, sell and convey the same, and will warrant
and defend the same against all claims and demands whatsoever. The only liens, charges, or
encumbrances against said property are as follows: None."
Thus, Reliance not only had the benefit of the recording
statutes to protect its mortgage priority, but the representation of the record owner, who was in possession,
that there were no other liens or encumbrances. These
are the things which a normal, prudent mortgagee would
look for to be certain its mortgage would be a first lien
on the residence. Plaintiff should be estopped from asserting at this late date his purported lien, as between
him and Reliance. As to the owners, his lien rights are
not under appeal.
POINT II
BURDEN OF PROOF FALLS ON PLAINTIFF ASSERT-

ING

DELAYED

STRICT
MENTS.

MECHANIC'S

COMPLIANCE

WITH

LIEN,

TO

STATUTORY

ESTABLISH
REQUIRE-
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POINT III
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF LIEN WAS NOT FILED
WITHIN THE TIME OR IN THE MANNER REQUIRED BY
LAW SO AS TO PERMIT IT TO RELATE BACK AHEAD
OF THE PRIOR RECORDED RELIANCE MORTGAGE.

Absent some special statutory amnesty, plaintiff
will concede that its lien rights, being tardily filed, are
subsequent in time and right to the Reliance mortgage
already of record. Section 38-1-5 U.C.A. 19·53 purports
to relate liens back to the date of commencement of the
building (back to June 1961). To take advantage of
this legislative ex post facto, plaintiff must comply
strictly with the lien statutes.
As these lien rights asserted by plaintiff are in
derogation of the common law, strict construction of the
statutes becomes the rule ; and, in addition, plaintiff
must establish complete adherence to those statutory
prerequisites. Equitably, the plaintiff cannot justify a
priority over the prior recorded Reliance mortgage. The
burden of proof is on plaintiff to show an escape route
from his dilatory lien recording.
Permit us to test the lien of plaintiff against the
statutory requirements. The contract (Exh. P-3) is
dated May 28, 1961, the Notice of Lien (Exh. P -4) refers
to a written contract dated March 31, 1961. First work
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was .rune 1, 1961 and the completed house was delivered

into possession of owner in September 19'61. Plaintiff
wa~ an "original contractor" and, hence, had 80 days
"aftpr completion of his contract." (Sec. 38-1-7)
This 80-day period would take plaintiff to about
DecemlH'r 10, 1961, dependent upon the time in September wht>n he finished the house and delivered possession.
The Court is fortunate in having corroborating evidence
from the plaintiff himself in the Exhibit D·-10. This is
his registered mail letter to Mr. Thomas dated December 15, 1961, which says that if the balance owing is
not paid or satisfactory arrangements made by December 26, 1961, then the lien would be filed. By this letter,
plaintiff is, in essence, acknowledging that he had heretofore cmnpleted his contract (or he would not have
any lien rights). Thus, once again, his time for filing
Notice of Lien could not conceiveably extend to April
10, 1962 when he finally recorded his Notice.
The few insignificant items of work done after
September 1961 are itemized above. Under the rule of
Trilcox v. Cloward, 56 P. 2d 88, Utah 503, trivial
or minor adjustments done after the main work may
not be used by contractor to extend his lien rights. In
Xovember they hung storm doors, but these are not
in the plans or specifications and were at the request
of Daniel Thomas, not the one contracting for the construction. On January 10, 1961, the front door thresh-
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hold was installed. Anyone knows that such is a small
piece of wood which goes under the door to keep out
drafts and would probably cost about $2.00, though no
figure was given. Similar minor items are detailed by
plaintiff in his testimony.
Working back from the recording date on the lien
notice (April 10, 1962.) for 80 days, we would go back
to January 20, 19'62. During this 80-day period only
four things were done:
February 12

Rain guttering tract;

not in the con-

F'ebruary 12

Aluminum mullion in corner window - $2.83 (Exh. P-·6) plus one
hour;

March 30

Plastering the foundation- $25.00

April

Painting carport - $35.00

All of these could have been done back in September
1961. The contractor either had no direct duty on these,
delayed them solely for his own convenience or to try
to reestablish his lost lien rights. These do not qualify
for any more than a lien right for about $66.00. New
work not in the contract does not relate back lien rights.
It seems significant to us that another exhibit prepared by plaintiff himself probably speaks eloquently
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ag-ainst him. Ho vohmtarily brought in his account book
(l~~xh. P-23). On the very page where the exhibit marking is made, we find all of his expenditures for materials
on the 1916 South 16th East. These records in his
handwriting show the last expenditure by him to he on
November 21, 1961. None of his pretended later items
are reflected. This account book confirms that the contract had been completed well in advance of November
1961.
Exhibit P-24, also presented by plaintiff, contains
this language, "Jobs Finish 19,61 hut bill paid 19r62."
Then it contains three references to awnings and insulation for 1916 South 16th East. Hence, again in his own
hand, the plaintiff has confirmed our position that the
contract was completed in 19·61.
Plaintiff has the burden of proof that he has complied fully with the lien statutes of Utah to permit
this Notice of April 10, 1962, to relate back to June
1961, the date of first work on this small house. The
time schedules all refer back to the "completion of his
contract" date for the commencement of the 80-day lien
filing. Everything, except for plaintiff's belated attempts to rejuvinate a dead lien, demonstrate that the
home was completed in September 1961:
(a)

Home occupied September 1961;
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(b)

Account book (Exh. P-23);

·(c)

196,2 accounts (Exh. P-24);

(d)

Registered mail notice in December (Exh.
Dr-10),

At a fairly recent date, this Court reviewed the lien
laws carefully and held in Utah S a,vings & Loan vs.
Mecham, 366 P. (2d) 598, 12 Ut. (2d) 335, that the liens
are "purely statutory, not contractual, and none can be
acquired unless the claimant has complied with the
statutory provisions creating the lien."
We urge strongly that the plaintiff has failed to
show by his proof such compliance with the statute.
The contract was "completed" in 19,61 and no Notice
of Lien was filed within 80 days. No stretch of the
rule in favor of the plaintiff is appropriate here because
of the innocent nature of Reliance in loaning the money
and taking and recording its mortgage on a home apparently fully completed many, many months before . .As
we are contesting priorities, the Court should properly
leave plaintiff to his personal remedy against Mr. Ray
Thomas, the one with whom he contracted. The judgment for the unpaid sum is not attacked herein.
In passing, we call to the 'Court's attention the
unique procedural position adopted by plaintiff. He
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has di~mi~~C'd the case as against the owners of record
(mortgagors) Daniel Thomas, et ux. How can he hope
to have a valid forecloure of his purported lien without
the record title holders in the case~ Apparently, he had
PlPrted to rely upon the credit of Ray ·Thomas with
whom he has contracted.

Another procedural defect is apparent. Section
38-1-11 U.C.A. 1953 requires the filing of a lis pendens
and states that the lien shall be void as to persons not
parties. Plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed out. the
record title owners, as noted above, so no valid foreclosure could be ordered by the District Court. The
reeord is devoid of any evidence of a lis pendens being
Pxecuted or filed.
A request for a Finding clearly spelling out the
extraordinary dismissal of the record title owners was
presented (R-30) by this appellant, Reliance. ·The trial
Court failed to make any Finding though the pre-trial
order (R-26) clearly recites plaintiff's dismissal as
against the said record title owners, Daniel G. and
Bette E. Thomas.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO FILE HIS ACTION TO FORECLOSE HIS LIEN WITHIN THE TIME REQUIRED BY SECTION 38-1-11, UCA 1953.

he S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and L
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
Should the Court deem the preceed.ing three Points
insufficient to reverse the Judgment herein as to priorities of the Reliance mortgage and plaintiff's asserted
lien, still this last point is fatal to plaintiff's cause of
action. Because of the preemptive character of the lien
laws and, particularly, the "relating back" language, the
Legislature imposed a twelve month limitation for action
on a lien.
This twelve-month period starts
U.C.A. 19'5,3) :
(a)

(Sec. 38-1-11

completion of the original contract

or
(b)

the suspension of work thereunder for a
period of thirty days.

No doubt, the Legislature had in mind situations
just as have developed in our present case. It was not
intended that a contractor could trap the unwary or
even the prudent mortgagee or purchaser. If a contractor was not paid, he must file his lien within 80
days; but he must file his lis pendens and he must file
his action within twelve months after either completion
or suspension of work for thirty days.
As we have discussed the "completion" phase above
in regards to the 80 day lien filing period, we will not
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rPpeat the details here. But we must call to your attention the fact that the home apparently completed and
o<·cnpied in September 19·61 and this action was not
fi l~·d tmtil March 28, 1963, 18 months after apparent
<'ompletion.
We turn now to the alternate, but equally valid,
date for the running of the 12 month limitation.
The statute sets this time as "or the suspension of work
thereunder for a period of thirty days." No dispute
exists in the record on a suspension of work for more
than thirty days. We refer you back to the schedule in
the statement of facts and call to your attention the
lapse from November 1961 to January 10, 1962. Actually, the November work was on storm door for Daniel
Thomas and not a part of the contract and so, in fact,
the time runs from October 19·61, when the corner window sill was poured, until January 10, 19'62, when the
threshhold was installed for the front door.
~tarting

"\Vork on this house was undeniably suspended for
over thirty days. Plaintiff had delivered possession of
the completed home in September 19·61. He testified
that thereafter he was building a separate and entirely
different home next door. Apparently, he may have
attended to the few minor items in 1962 as an accomodation for n!r. Daniel Thomas but not a part of his
contract on the home at issue.
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This same statute preserves for plaintiff his personal action for debt against persons for whom labor
and materials are furnished. We make no complaint
about that and no appeal is taken from the personal
judgment for the unpaid balance on his contract with
Mr. Ray Thomas.
Reliance, as appellant rn this matter, respectfully
submits to the Court that the trial court erred in not
finding that the cause of action of he plaintiff was
barred hy the statute for either or both of the reasons
that the action to foreclose the lien was not filed within
one year after completion of the contract or was not
filed within one year after a 30-day suspension of work.
This defense was pleaded at the very inception and was
maintained throughout the trial and restated in the
objections to the proposed findings that had been submitted to the Court. As this Court stated in Langton

Lime and Cement Co. v. Peery, 159· Pac. 49, 48 Ut. 112,
an action to enforce a mechanic's lien is an equity case.
Thus, this Court may fully review the facts as well
as the conclusions before the trial court and determine
with appellant that the trial court erred in permitting
the mechanic's lien to have priority ahead of the Reliance mortgage which was taken and recorded in good
faith.
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CONCLUSION
The mortgage financing of residences both on new
construction and existing construction is a vital element
in the growth and development of Utah. Utah has long
prided itself as being a state of home owners rather than
mere tPnants and we believe that the decisions of this
court have fostered that growth. The i:nd-qstry is
d('pendent upon a stability of law so that the priority
of mortgages will not be a matter of speculation and
conjecture. Here the builder of this home delivered
possession in September of 19·61 but waited until April
of 1962 before filing his lien for the unpaid $a,ooo
balance and until March of 19·63 before commencing an
action to foreclose that pretended lien~ His dilatory
attempt to assert the lien has led an innocent mortgagee
into financing this home in reliance upon the apparent
completion of the dwelling more than six months before
the mortgage was taken. Not only would it be inequitable and unjust to permit this late filed lien to relate
bark ahead of the mortgage, but it would also create
a precedent which would inhibit the normal mortgage
financing of dwellings and, to that extent, stifle the
natural growth and development of home ownership.
In reversing
of priority, your
out his recourse.
rights as against

the District Court solely on the issue
Court is not leaving the builder withThe Legislature has spelled out his
the property owner. Though plaintiff
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has voluntarily dismissed the case against the true
owner, thereby waiving his rights against the property,
we believe, yet he has the judgment against the person
with whom he contracted for construction of the residence. We urge that the Court determine that the
Reliance mortgage priority is ahead of the lien claimant's rights and to that extent reverse the District
Court's finding and judgment in this case.
Respectfully submitted.
PUGSLEY, HAYES, RAMPTON &
W.ATKISS

600 El Paso N'atural Gas Building
Salt (Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Reliance National
Life Insurance Company
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